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1. INTRODUCTION
Fudenberg and Levine [1994] (FL) showed that the limit of the set of
perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount factor
goes to one can be characterized by the solution of a family of static linear
programming problems. This result has been applied and extended by a
number of subsequent authors, including Kandori and Matsushima [1998],
Dellarocas [2003], and Ely et al [2003].
The FL result requires that the set of payoff vectors obtained by the al-
gorithm should have full dimension, that is, the dimension is equal to
the number of long-run players in the game. This paper extends the lin-
ear programming characterization to cases where this full-dimensionality
condition fails, either because of the payoff structure of the stage game, or
becauseof a restrictiontoequilibriumstrategieswhosecontinuationpayoffs
areonalower-dimensionalset. Weapplyourresulttothreesuchrestrictions
from the literature. The rst application is to repeated games with all long-
run players and observed actions, where the feasible payoffs in the stage
game lie in a lower-dimensional set. The linear programming characteriza-
tion allows us to generalize the results of Abreu et al [1994], who assumed
a condition called NEU condition and of Wen [1994], who assumed that
mixed strategies are observed. The second application is to the strongly
symmetric equilibrium studied by Abreu [1986] and Abreu et al [1986],
which restricts the continuation payoffs to the one-dimensional set where
all players' payoffs are identical. The third application is to the restriction
that all payoffs lie on a line segment of the Pareto frontier, which we use
to derive a sufcient condition for the exact achievability of rst-best out-
comes. Equilibria of this type, for which all continuation payoffs lie on the
Pareto frontier, have a strong renegotiation-proofness property: regardless
of the history, players can never unanimously prefer another equilibrium.
2. MODEL
We consider a repeated game with imperfect public monitoringplayed by
long-run and short-run players. We follow FL in the notation. In the stage
game, each player i= 1;:::;n simultaneously chooses a pure action ai from
a nite set Ai. a 2 A  Õ
n
i=1Ai induces a publicly observed outcome y 2Y
with probability py(a). Player i's payoff to an action prole a is gi(a). For
each mixed action prole a 2A  Õ
n
i=1Ai, we can induce py(a) and gi(a).
For i 2 LR  f1;:::;Lg, L 6 n, i is a long-run player whose objective is





dt 1gi(t):PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT 2
The remaining players j 2 SR  fL+1;:::;ng represent short-run players,




for the short-run players. That is, for each a 2 graph(B)  f(aLR;aSR) 2
A j aSR 2 B(aLR)g and each j = L+1;:::;n, aj maximizes gj(a0
j;a j).
Let A0 be a subset of graph(B). We focus on A0-perfect public equilib-
ria: strategy proles in which all players choose action proles from A0,
depending only on the public history, and in which following every pub-
lic history the remaining public strategy prole forms a Nash equilibrium.
Note that an action prole specied by an equilibrium belongs to A0 even
after an off-path history, but that each player's deviations from the equilib-
rium need not be inA0. E(A0;d) is the set of average present values for the
long-run players in A0-perfect public equilibria. We will characterize the
limit of E(A0;d) without the full-dimensionality condition.
3. ALGORITHM
WexA0 throughoutthissection. Wedene thesequenceX0;Q0;X1;Q1;X2;Q2;:::
where Xm are afne subspaces of RL and Qm are compact convex subsets of
Xm by the following procedure. Let X0 = RL. Let gLR(a) denote the vector
of payoffs for long-run players only. For given Xm, we consider a linear
programming problem for given a 2 A0 with gLR(a) 2 Xm, l 2 RL nf0g




(a) vi = (1 d)gi(ai;a i)+då
y2Y
py(ai;a i)wi(y)
for i 2 LR and ai 2 Ai s.t. ai(ai) > 0,
(b) vi > (1 d)gi(ai;a i)+då
y2Y
py(ai;a i)wi(y)
for i 2 LR and ai 2 Ai s.t. ai(ai) = 0,
(c) lv > lw(y) for y 2Y,
(d) w(y) 2 Xm for y 2Y.
If there isno(v;w)thatsatises constraints(a)-(d), thenwe setkm(a;l;d)=
 ¥. Note that k0(a;l;d) corresponds to k(a;l;d) in FL. Similarly to








l2RLnf0g: parallel to Xm
Hm(l)\Xm;
where H(l;k) = fv 2 RL j lv 6 kg. If Qm = / 0 or Qm is a singleton whose
element does not correspond to a static equilibrium in A0, we stop the al-
gorithm and dene Q(A0) = / 0.2 If Qm is a singleton consisting of a static
equilibrium payoff prole in A0 or we have dimQm = dimXm, we stop the
algorithm and dene Q(A0) = Qm. Otherwise, let Xm+1 be the afne hull
of Qm, which is the smallest afne space including Qm, and we again solve
a linear programming problem after Xm is replaced by Xm+1.
Note that every time the algorithm continues, the dimension of Xm de-
creases by at least 1, so the algorithm stops in a nite number of steps.
As is standard in this literature, payoff prole v is the target that will be
supported by some equilibrium, and the function w gives the continuation
payoffs w(y) starting tomorrow if the current outcome is y. Constraints
(a) are the accounting identities that dene the expected payoff prole v,
and constraints (b) are the incentive constraints, requiring that playing a
maximizes expected payoff provided that continuation payoffs are given by
w. Constraints (c) require that all of the continuation payoffs are included
in the half-space dened by v and l; loosely speaking, the continuation
payoffs are not allowed to be better (in the l direction) than v is.
Each step of this algorithm differs from FL's only in constraints (d) and
A0. Constraints (d) require that all of the continuation payoffs are included
by the afne hull of Qm 1 in the previous step, and A0 is a restriction on
equilibrium action proles. In the case of A0 = graph(B), the rst step of
the algorithm is exactly the same as FL's linear programming problem. Ac-
tually, Q0 is equal to what FL call Q. If we assume the full dimensionality
of Q, that is, dim Q = L, then the algorithm stops at the rst step, and we
have Q(graph(B)) = Q.
By this algorithm, we obtain the limit of A0-perfect public equilibrium
payoffs, which is a generalization of Theorem 3.1 in FL.
1We should point out that the condition given in FL Lemma 3.1 (iii) is sufcient but not
necessary for k(a;l) = lgLR(a); FL incorrectly assert that the condition is necessary as
well. The condition is only necessary under the additional assumption that all outcomes
have positive probability under a.
2Qm = / 0 is possible only if A0 contains no static equilibrium.PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT 4
Let E(A0;d) be the set of A0-perfect public equilibrium payoff proles
when public randomization devices are available at the beginning of each
period. E(A0;d) is a bounded convex set that contains E(A0;d).
Theorem. E(A0;d)  Q(A0) for any d. If Q(A0) 6= / 0, then for any
compact set K in the relative interior of Q(A0), there exists ¯ d<1 such that
K E(A0;d) for any d> ¯ d.3 Hence limd!1E(A0;d)=limd!1E(A0;d)=
Q(A0).
Proof. We show that E(A0;d)  Qm for any m by induction. Suppose
that E(A0;d)  Xm, and we show that E(A0;d)  Qm  Xm+1. If not,
since E(A0;d) is bounded, we may nd a positive number e > 0, a point
v 2 E(A0;d), and a unit vector l 2 RLnf0g parallel to Xm such that lv =





where, for almost every realization w 2 [0;1] of a public randomization
device, v(w) is enforceable with some current action prole a(w) 2A0 and
continuation payoff proles w(y;w) in E(A0;d)  H(l;k+e)\Xm. Since
v(w) 2 E(A0;d)  Xm, we have gLR(a(w)) 2 Xm. Pick w 2 [0;1] such
that lv(w) > k. For this w, by shifting payoff proles independently of y,
we can enforce the shifted target payoff prole v0(w)= v [(1 d)=d]el by
a(w)andw0(y;w)=w(y;w) (1=d)el2H(l;k0)\Xm, wherek0 =k [(1 
d)=d]e > km(l). So the score lv0(w) > k0 is attained with continuation
payoff proles in H(l;k0)\Xm, which contradicts the denition of km(l).
If Q(A0) is set to be the empty set because, at some step of the al-
gorithm, Qm is a singleton whose element does not correspond to a static
equilibrium in A0, then, since there is no static equilibrium in A0 and con-
tinuation payoffs need to be constant, we have E(A0;d) = / 0 = Q(A0).
Otherwise, we have E(A0;d)  Qm = Q(A0) for some m.
Now suppose that Q(A0) 6= / 0, and let K be a compact set in the relative
interior of Q(A0). We will showthat K E(A0;d) for all sufciently large
d. If Q(A0) is a singleton, then E(A0;d) = Q(A0) for any d. Otherwise,
letX be theafne hullof Q(A0). Then the proofdiffers fromFL'soriginal
one mainly in that we use the relative topology induced on X instead of the
standard topology on RL.4 Since K is a compact set in the relative interior
of Q(A0), there exists a smooth, convex, and compact set W  K in the
3The relative interior of a subset S of RL is the interior of S under the topology induced
on the afne hull of S.
4Our proof also differs because it does not assume the existence of static equilibria in
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relative interior of Q(A0). We show that W  E(A0;d) for sufciently
large d. Since W is compact and convex, it is enough to show that for each
v 2 W, there exist d < 1 and a relatively open neighborhood U of v with
U  P(A0;d;W), where P(A0;d;W) is the set of payoff proles generated
by some a 2 A0 and W (Fudenberg et al [1994, Lemma 4.2]).
First, suppose that v is on the relative boundary of W. Let l be parallel
to X and normal toW at v. Let k = lv, and let H = H(l;k) be the unique
half-space in the direction of l such that H \X containsW and its relative
boundary is tangent toW at v. SinceW is in the relative interior of Q(A0),
there exists an action prole a 2 A0 with gLR(a) 2 X that generates a
point v0 2 X with lv0 > k using continuation payoffs in H(l;lv0)\X.
Then, for some d0 < 1 and e > 0, (a;v) can be enforced with respect to
H(l;k e)\X.
Second, suppose that v is in the relative interior ofW. Pick any l parallel
to X. Let k = lv and H = H(l;k). Similarly to the above argument, there
exists a 2 A0 such that, for some d0 < 1 and e > 0, (a;v) can be enforced
with respect to H(l;k e)\X.










and jw(y;d00) vj < ¯ k(1 d00).
Consider the ball U(d00) around v of radius ¯ k(1 d00) in X. Since W is
smooth in X, for d00 sufciently close to 1 there exists  k > 0 such that the
difference between H \X and H \W in U(d00) is at most  k(1 d00)2. It
follows that there exists d < 1 such that (a;v) can be enforced by continu-
ation payoffs w(y;d) in the relative interior of W. Since w(y;d) are in the
relative interior, they may be translated by a small constant independent of
y generating incentive compatible payoffs in a relative neighborhood U of
v. 
Remark. Our Theorem shows that allowing public randomizations does not
change the limit set. For a xed d, however, E(A0;d) may be larger than
E(A0;d).
Several other choices of how to determine the sets Xm lead to the same
resultQ(A0). Forexample, at thebeginningof therst step, we can choose
X0 to be any afne subspace of RL that contains gLR(a) for every a 2 A0.
If 1 6 dimQm < dimXm, then we can move to the next step with any afne
subspace Xm+1 of Xm that contains Qm.PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT 6






It is easy to extend this theorem to games with innitely many pure ac-
tions.5 However, allowing innitely many signals would involve measure-
theoretic complications that are beyond the scope of this paper.
4. APPLICATIONS
4.1. Fudenberg and Maskin's Example. To illustrate the algorithm, we
apply it to the example Fudenberg and Maskin [1986] used to motivate the
full dimensionalitycondition. We set L=n=3, so that there are three long-
run players and no short-run players, setY = A = f0;1g3, and set py(a) = 1
if and only if y = a, so that the signal perfectly reveals the action prole.
Stage game payoffs are depicted in Figure 4.1.
Let A0 = A and X0 = R3, and solve the rst step of our algorithm. By
a simple computation, we have Q0 = f(x;x;x) j 0 6 x 6 1g. Since Q0 has
a lower dimension than X0, we set X1 = f(x;x;x) j x 2 Rg and move to the
second step of our algorithm.
In the second step, we have two directions parallel to X1 (up to positive
constants), 1 = (1;1;1) and  1 = ( 1; 1; 1). We rst consider the case
of l =  1. Fix any a. As Fudenberg and Maskin show, for any a, there
exist a player i and an action ai such that gi(ai;a i) > 1=4. Since (v;w) in







Since gLR(a) 2 X1 and w(y) 2 X1 for any outcome y by constraints (d),
it follows from constraints (a) that v 2 X1 as well. Then, since  3vi =












every player i, max is replaced by sup in the denition of km(a;l;d), and constraints
(a) are required not only for every ai with positive point mass but also for almost every ai
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and hence vi >1=4. Therefore, we have k1(a; 1)6  3=4 for any a. Since
the equality holds when each player mixes the two actions with equal prob-
ability, we have k1( 1) =  3=4 and H1( 1) = H( 1; 3=4). We also
have H1(1) = H(1;3) by a simple computation.
Since Q1 =H1(1)\H1( 1)\X1 =f(x;x;x)j1=46x61ganddimQ1 =
1=dimX1, we stopthealgorithmandconcludethatQ(A)=Q1 isthelimit
set of subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs as d ! 1.
The same result is obtained by Fudenberg and Maskin [1986] and Wen
[1994]. Fudenberg and Maskin determine the limit set by a direct com-
putation in this specic game, whereas Wen uses effective minimax values.
Wen'smethodisapplicabletorepeated gameswithperfect monitoringwith-
out the full dimensionality condition. Note that our algorithm is even more
general, as we admit imperfect public monitoring and short-run players.
4.2. Characterization of the Limit Payoffs in General Stage Games
with Observed Actions and All Long-Run Players. Consider repeated
gameswith perfect monitoringand without short-run players, that is,Y =A,
py(a) = 1 if and only if y = a, and n = L. We assume that A0 Ap  fa 2
A j a(a) = 1 for some a 2 Ag, i.e., A0 contains all pure action proles.
We assume that no player is universally indifferent: for every player i,
there exist two action proles a, a0 2 A such that gi(a) 6= gi(a0). Players i
and j have equivalent utility functions if there exist c 2 R and d > 0 such
that gj(a) = c+dgi(a) for all a 2 A. Denote by I+
i the set of players whose
utility functions are equivalent to gi. Similarly, denote by I 
i the set of play-
ers whose utility functions are equivalent to  gi. The stage game satises
the nonequivalent utilities (NEU) condition if I+
i = fig for all i (Abreu et al
[1994]).
Player i's effective minimax payoff is given by
vi(A0)= inf
a2A0maxfgi(aj;a j)j j2I+
i ;aj 2Aj; or j2I 
i ;aj 2Aj s:t: aj(aj)>0g:
If A0 is compact, then the inmum operator can be replaced by the min-
imum operator because the objective function is lower semi-continuous in
a.




a2A0maxfgi(ai;a i) j ai 2 Aig;
and Wen's [1994] effective minimax payoff
vWen
i (A0) = inf
a2A0maxfgi(aj;a j) j j 2 I+
i ;aj 2 Ajg:
Proposition 4.1. We have the following relations between the effective min-
imax and Wen's effective minimax:PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT 8
FIGURE 4.2. A game in which vWen







i (A0) 6 vi(A0).
(2) vWen
i (A0) = vi(A0) if A0 =Ap or I 
i = / 0.
(3) vs
i(A0) = vi(A0) if (A0 = Ap or A) and the NEU condition is satis-
ed.
Proof. Parts 1 and 2 are obvious. Part 3 is also obvious, except for the case
in which A0 = A, the NEU condition is satised, and I 
i 6= / 0. Since the
NEU condition is satised and I 
i 6= / 0, I 
i is a singleton fjg. Let a
 i be
a minimax action prole against player i, and a
i is a maximin action of
player i against player j when the other players' action prole is xed to be
a
 ij. By the minimax theorem, (a
i ;a
j) is a Nash equilibrium of the game
between players i and j when the other players play a
 ij. Since a
i is a best
response to a
 i for player i, we have gi(ai;a
 i) 6 gi(a) for any ai 2 Ai.
Also, since a
j is a best response to a
 j for player j, player j is indifferent
among all pure actions taken with positive probabilities under a
j, i.e., we
have gj(aj;a
 j) = gj(a) for any aj 2 Aj such that a
j(aj) > 0. Since
j 2 I 
i , we have gi(aj;a
 j) = gi(a) for any aj 2 Aj such that a
j(aj) > 0.
Therefore, we have vi(A) 6 gi(a) = vs
i(A). 
Example. We may have vWen
i (A0) < vi(A0). Consider the stage game in
Figure 4.2. Note that I+
1 = f1;2g and I 
1 = f3g. We have vWen
1 (A) = 5=2,
where the solution a to Wen's minimax problem is such that players 1 and
2 choose the rst actions, and player 3 mixes the two actions with equal
probability. We also have v1(A) = 3, where the solution a to our minimax
problem is such that players 1 and 3 choose the rst actions, and player 2
chooses the rst action with probability more than or equal to 1=2.
LetV be the set of feasible payoff proles, i.e., the convexhull of fg(a)2
Rn j a 2 Ag. Let
V(A0) = fv 2V j vi > vi(A0) for every player ig;
V(A0) = fv 2V j vi > vi(A0) for every player ig
be the sets of feasible payoff proles that weakly and strongly dominate
v(A0), respectively.PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT 9
Proposition 4.2. Q(A0) V(A0). IfV(A0) 6= / 0, then Q(A0) =V(A0).
Abreu et al [1994] showed the folk theorem under the NEU condition,
which corresponds to Proposition 4.2 when (A0 = Ap or A) and the NEU
condition is satised. Wen [1994] showed the pure-strategy folk theorem,
which corresponds to Proposition 4.2 for A0 =Ap.6 These classical results
are stronger than Proposition 4.2 in the following sense. They show that
E(Ap;d)V(Ap) for any d, and that, for any v2V(Ap), there existsd<1
such that v 2E(Ap;d) (exactly attained as an equilibrium payoff prole) for
any d > d. On the other hand, combined with our Theorem, Proposition 4.2
claims that any point v 2V(Ap) is approximately attained as an equilibrium
payoff prole. See Subsection 4.4 for a discussion of the exact attainability
of efcient payoffs.
We will show Proposition 4.2 by executing our algorithm explicitly. Let
X be the afne hull of V. We have dimX > 1 because of the absence of
universal indifference. A vector l 2 Rn nf0g parallel to X is said to be a
punishment direction for player i if there exist c 2 R and d > 0 such that
lv = c dvi for every v 2 X. If l is a punishment direction for player i,
then we have H(l;lv)\X = fv0 2 X j v0
i > vig.
Lemma 4.3. There exists a punishment direction for player i.
Proof. Let l be the projection of  ei to X, where ei is the vector whose
ith component is 1 and whose other components are 0. l is nonzero since
player i is not universally indifferent. By construction, l is a punishment
direction for player i. 
Let Xi = fvi 2 R j v 2 Xg and Xij = f(vi;vj) 2 R2 j v 2 Xg be the projec-
tions of X to the i-axis and to the ij-plane, respectively.
Lemma 4.4. Xi = R; if j = 2 I+
i [I 
i , then Xij = R2 .
Proof. Xi is a nonemptyafne subspace of R, i.e., a point or R. Since player
i is not universally indifferent, Xi contains at least two points. So we have
Xi = R.
6As we noted in the example, in the class of mixed-strategy subgame-perfectequilibria
(A0 = A), Wen's denition of effective minimax may be lower than ours. In this case,
the effective minimax value in his denition is not a tight lower bound for mixed-strategy
subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs. Wen assumes that mixed strategies are observable
and constructs equilibria with payoffs as low as vWen
i (A) in general games. Our results
show that the assumption that mixed strategies are observable is not innocuous in cases
where the NEU condition is not satised. Intuitively, inducing players to randomize when
mixing probabilities are not observed requires the use of continuation payoffs to make the
player indifferent, and in the absence of the NEU condition, it may not be possible to
induce players to randomize without rewarding the opponent they are trying to punish.
See footnote 11 in Abreu et al [1994].PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT 10
Xij is a nonempty afne subspace of R2, i.e., a point, a line, or R2; and
from the previous step Xij is not a point or a vertical or horizontal line.
Since j = 2 I+
i [I 
i , Xij is not a line with a nonzero slope, so Xij = R2. 
We also have
Lemma 4.5. A mixed action prole a and player i's payoff vi are enforce-
able with respect to fv0 2 X j v0
i > vig if and only if vi > gi(aj;a j) for
any j 2 I+
i and any aj 2 Aj and for any j 2 I 
i and any aj 2 Aj such that
aj(aj) > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Lemma 4.6. If l is not a punishment direction for player i, then, for any
(x;k) 2 R2, there exists v 2 H(l;k)\X such that vi 6 x.
Proof. Since l is not a punishment direction for player i, lv and  vi are
linear utility functions that represent different preference orderings on X.
Then there exist v1, v2 2 X such that (i) lv1 > lv2 and v1
i > v2
i , or (ii)
lv1 > lv2 and v1
i = v2
i .
In case (i), pick any v3 2 H(l;k)\X, and let v = v3  c(v1  v2). Then
we have v 2 H(l;k)\X and vi 6 x for a sufciently large c.
In case (ii), pick any v4, v5 2 X such that v4
i > v5
i , and let  v1 = v1+e(v4 
v5). It follows from Lemma 4.4 that such v4 and v5 exist. For a sufciently
small e > 0, we have l  v1 > lv2 and  v1
i > v2
i . Thus we can apply case (i)
to the pair ( v1;v2). 
Lemma 4.7. If l is not a punishment direction for any player, then, every
pure strategy prole a 2 A and the corresponding payoff prole v = g(a)
are enforceable with respect to H(l;lv)\X.
Proof. Dene w(a0) 2 H(l;lv)\X for each a0 2 A as follows:
 If there exists a unique player i such that a0
i 6= ai, then, because
of Lemma 4.6, we can construct a sufciently strong punishment
for player i by setting w(a0) 2 H(l;lv)\X such that wi(a0) 6
[vi (1 d)gi(a0
i;a i)]=d.
 If a0 = a or a0
j 6= aj for at least two players j, then let w(a0) = v.
Then (a;v) is enforced by w. 
Lemma 4.8. If V(A0) 6= / 0, then dimV(A0) = dimX.
Proof. Here we use the relative topology induced to X. Suppose V (A0) 6=
/ 0. Then there exists a relative interior point v of V such that v 2 V(A0).
Otherwise,V nV(A0) isa closed propersubsetofV that containsthe whole
relativeinterior ofV. This contradicts the fact that the closure of the relativePERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT 11
interior of compact and convex set V is equal to V. Since V nV(A0) is
closed, v is also a relative interior point of V(A0), so V(A0) and X have
the same dimension. 
Now we can prove Proposition 4.2 as follows.
Proof. We use our algorithm with the constraint X0 = X on continuation
payoff proles at the rst step. Since A0  Ap, it follows from Lemmas
4.3, 4.5, and 4.7 that we have Q0 =V(A0). Therefore, we have Q(A0) 
V(A0).
If V(A0) 6= / 0, then, by Lemma 4.8, we have dimQ0 = dimX0. We stop
the algorithm at the rst step, and obtain Q(A0) =V(A0). 
4.3. Symmetry Assumptions.
4.3.1. Strongly Symmetric Equilibria. Assume that the static game is sym-
metric for long-run players, i.e., A1 =  = AL and gi(a) = gj(a0) for any
i; j 2 LR and a;a0 2 A if ai = a0
j, a0
LR is a permutation of aLR, and aSR = a0
SR.
The signal structure is also symmetric, i.e., py(a) = py(a0) if a0
LR is a per-
mutation of aLR, and aSR = a0
SR.
A strategy prole is strongly symmetric (for long-run players) if all long-
run players take the same action after every history. In this case we take A0
to be the set As of symmetric mixed action proles for the long-run players
in graph(B), and denote by Qs the result Q(As) of our algorithm under
the restriction of As. Our Theorem can characterize the limit of E(As;d)
by Qs. Set X0 = f(x;:::;x) 2 RL j x 2 Rg, and compute Q0 in the rst
step of our algorithm. Since As contains at least one static equilibrium, we
have Q0 6= / 0. No matter whether Q0 is a singleton (which must be a unique
symmetric static equilibriumpayoff) or one-dimensional, we have Qs =Q0.
Since continuationpayoffsare restrictedto besymmetric,Qs maybe strictly
smaller than FL's Q without any restriction on continuation payoffs. This
corresponds to Abreu et al's [1986] analysis for large d.
As a corollary of our Theorem, we have the following.
Corollary 4.9. Qs = limd!1E(As;d). That is, Qs is the limit as d goes to 1
of strongly symmetric equilibrium payoffs with discount factor d.
4.3.2. Partially Symmetric Equilibria. We can consider partially symmet-
ric equilibria. Suppose that long-run and short-run players are divided into
several groups, for example, buyers and sellers. The players' payoffs are
symmetricwithingroups, butmay be asymmetric between groups. Then we
can restrict our attention to partially symmetric equilibria where the players
behave symmetrically within groups. As in the case of strongly symmet-
ric equilibria, let X0 be the set of payoff proles symmetric within groups.PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT 12
Then, we can execute the rst step of our algorithm, in which continuation
payoffs are constrained to be symmetric within groups.
Note that the FL result, on the one hand, cannot apply to partially sym-
metric equilibria when there are L 1 or less groups because Q0 does not
satisfy the full-dimensionality condition. On the other hand, it is possible
to apply Abreu et al's [1990] result and obtain the set of partially symmet-
ric equilibria for any xed d, but when the number of groups for long-run
players is 2 or more, it is difcult and sometimes practically infeasible to
compute the set P(A0;d;W) generated by W for any nonlinear constraint
W on continuation payoff proles. By contrast, our algorithm is applicable
and relatively easy to carry out.
4.4. Exact Achievability of First-Best Outcomes. In the case of A0 =
graph(B) and X0 = RL, FL showed that, under the assumption of dimQ0 =
L, for any compact set K in the interior of Q0, there exists ¯ d < 1 such that
K  E(graph(B);d) for any d > ¯ d. Under an identiability condition, Q0 is
a full-dimensional set containing all payoff proles that Pareto-dominate a
static equilibrium (Fudenberg et al [1994, Theorem 6.1]). When this iden-
tiability condition is satised, some efcient payoff proles can be ap-
proximated by equilibrium payoff proles as the discount factor tends to
1, even if the actions are imperfectly observed. However, this conclusion
leaves open the question of whether a given efcient payoff vector v can be
exactly attained by an equilibrium payoff for some large but xed d.
Recently Athey and Bagwell [2001] have provided sufcient conditions
for the exact achievability of rst-best payoffs in a repeated duopoly game.
Our Theorem leads to the following generalization of their analysis.
Let V be the convex hull of fgLR(a) 2 RL j a 2 graph(B)g, let h be a
hyperplane tangent to V, and let Ah = fa 2 graph(B) j gLR(a) 2 hg. To
achieve a payoff prole in h, it is necessary for the players to take actions
in Ah at any on-path history (a public history which occurs with positive
probability). As an extreme case, if V \h is a singleton fvg, then exactly
achieving v requires a stringent condition (Fudenberg et al [1994, Theorem
6.5]).
Here we sketch how to obtain a sufcient condition for exact achiev-
ability. By our algorithm, we can characterize the limit of E(Ah;d).7 Let
7Imposing the restriction of Ah on off-path play does not lose much generality. If the
full support condition holds for Ah, i.e., py(a) > 0 for any a 2 Ah and y 2 Y, then there
is no off-path public history, and hence any perfect public equilibrium which achieves a
payoffprolein h is always anAh-perfectpublicequilibrium. Moreover,if the full support
condition is not satised but there is an inefcient static equilibrium, we can easily modify
our argument by analyzing on- and off-schedule deviations separately. See Athey andPERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT 13
X0 = h. We compute the algorithm until we nally obtain Q(Ah). We
denote it by Qh.
Our Theorem implies the following.
Corollary 4.10. If Qh 6= / 0, then the relative interior of Qh is nonempty,
and for any relative interior point v of Qh, there exists ¯ d < 1 such that
v 2 E(Ah;d) for any d > ¯ d.
Equilibria in Qh have the property that there is no history where players
unanimouslyprefer someotherfeasibleoutcometothe continuationpayoffs
prescribed by the equilibria. This is a very strong form of renegotiation-
proofness, and implies that the equilibria are strongly renegotiation-proof
in the sense of Farrell and Maskin [1989].
In the case of two-player games, we can give a simple necessary and
sufcient condition for Qh to be nonempty. Fix two pure action proles a1
and a2 whose payoff vectors g1 = g(a1) and g2 = g(a2) are on the Pareto
frontier. Suppose that gi
i < g
j
i for i 6= j, so that ai is worse for player i than









2) be the line connecting g1 and g2. Note that b1, b2 > 0. We
assumeAh =fa1;a2g for simplicity,i.e., no payoff prole other than g1 and
g2 attains h.8 We focus on Ah-perfect public equilibria.
Let gii = (gii
i ;gii
j) 2 h be dened by gii




i )=bj. Let ` = fv 2 h j g11
1 6 v1 6 g22
1 g. ` is the empty set if g11
1 > g22
1 ,
and a line segment if g11
1 < g22
1 . (If g11
1 = g22
1 , then ` is a point.)














Denition. The signal structure p has perfect detectability for player i if
the set Y of outcomes can be partitioned intoY i, Yii, and Yij such that for
pi(a)  å
y2Yi
py(a); pii(a)  å
y2Yii
py(a); pij(a)  å
y2Yij
py(a);
there exist wi, wij > 0 such that
(1) pii(ai) < 1 and pi(ai)wi+pij(ai)wij = gii
i  gi
i,
Bagwell [2001]. Note also that allowing off-pathplay not inAh destroys the renegotiation-
proofness property of the equilibria.
8Ah = fa1;a2g if a1
i 6= a2
i for both players i and no three pure action payoff proles lie
on a line. The latter condition is satised in generic nite stage games, but not in duopoly
games where both rms produce homogeneous goods with a common constant marginal
cost. If Ah ) fa1;a2g, then the condition of g11
1 > g22
1 in Part 1 of Proposition 4.11 is not
sufcientforQh to be empty. Theremay be anequilibriumwhich prescribesactionproles
in Ahnfa1;a2g after some history.PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT 14
(2) pii(ai;ai







i for any aj 6= ai
j.
If p is perfect monitoring (i.e., Y = A and py(a) = 1 if and only if y =
a), then p has perfect detectability for player i by setting Y i = faig, Yii =
f(ai;ai
j) j ai 6= ai
ig, Yij = fa j aj 6= ai
jg, wi = gii
i  gi









1 , then Qh = / 0 under any signal structure, and there is no
Ah-perfect public equilibrium for any d.
(2) If g11
1 < g22
1 , then for any signal structure p with perfect detectabil-
ity for the both players and any compact line segment in the rel-
ative interior of `, there exists e > 0 such that Qh is a nonempty
set containing the line segment under any signal structure  p such
that maxy;ajpy(a)   py(a)j < e; so there exists ¯ d < 1 such that v 2
E(Ah;d) for any d > ¯ d.
Proof. see Appendix. 
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APPENDIX A. PROOFS
A.1. Proof of Lemma 4.5. We use the following lemma in the proof of
Lemma 4.5 below to deal with indifference conditions for players in J =
I+
i [I 
i . Fudenberg and Maskin [1990, Lemma 2] prove the same result
for the case of two players. For notational convenience, for a given mixed
action prole a, take Sj = faj 2 Aj j aj(aj) > 0g, S = Õj2JSj, s = aJ, and
u(s) = gi(s;a J).
Lemma A.1. If sj(sj) > 0 and x > u(sj;s j) for all j 2 J and all sj 2 Sj,
then there exists f : S ! R such that f(s) > x for all s 2 S and
x = (1 d)u(sj;s j)+d å
s j2S j
s j(s j)f(s)
for all j 2 J and all sj 2 Sj.
Proof. We will show the existence of f algorithmically. Let S0
j = Sj and
r0
j(sj) = [x (1 d)u(sj;s j)]=d for each j 2 J and each sj 2 Sj. For each






































j (sj) = rm
j (sj) (pm
 j   pm+1
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Note that åsj2S0
j sj(sj)r0
j(sj) = [x (1 d)u(s)]=d is independent of j.
Inductively, if åsj2Sm
j sj(sj)rm




























is also independent of j.
Let m be the rst step at which there exists j 2 J such that Sm+1
j = / 0.
If Sm+1





















where the second equality holds because åsj2Sm
j sj(sj)rm
j (sj) is indepen-
dent of j, and the inequality holds because rm
j (sj)=pm
 j > xm
for all sj 2
Sm
j with strict inequality for all sj 2 Sm+1
j , and sj(sj) > 0 for all sj 2 Sm
j .
Thus we have Sm+1
j = / 0 for all j 2 J.
Since p0




x (1 d)maxfu(sj;s j) j j 2 J;sj 2 Sjg
d
>x:
For any m < m and for any sj 2 Sm+1





















Therefore, we have xm > x for any m 6 m.
Let Sm  Õj2JSm
j . For any s 2 S, there exists a unique m(s) 6 m such
that s 2 Sm(s)nSm(s)+1. Then we dene f(s) = xm(s) > x for each s 2 S.PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT 17






























for any j 2 J and any sj 2 Sj. 
Lemma. 4.5. A mixed action prole a and player i's payoff vi are enforce-
able with respect to fv0 2 X j v0
i > vig if and only if vi > gi(aj;a j) for
any j 2 I+
i and any aj 2 Aj and for any j 2 I 
i and any aj 2 Aj such that
aj(aj) > 0.
Proof. If part. Dene w(a)2X with wi(a)>vi for each a2 A as follows:
 If thereexistsa uniqueplayer j suchthataj(aj)=0 and j2I+
i , then
let w(a)2 X be such that vi 6 wi(a)6 [vi (1 d)gi(aj;a j)]=d. It
follows from Lemma 4.4 and vi > gi(aj;a j) that such w(a) exists.
 If there exists a unique player j such that aj(aj) = 0 and j = 2 I+
i ,
then let w(a) 2 X be such that wi(a) > vi and wj(a) 6 [vj  (1 
d)gj(aj;a j)]=d. The existence of such w(a) follows from Lemma
4.4 .
 If we have aj(aj) > 0 for all players j, let J = I+
i [I 
i and de-
ne w(a) = wJ(aJ)+åj= 2J(w0 wj(aj)) 2 X as follows: By setting
x = vi in Lemma A.1, we obtain a function f such that f(aJ) > vi,
any action in Sj is indifferent for each player j 2 J, and player i's
total payoff is equal to vi. It follows from Lemma 4.4 that there ex-
ists wJ(aJ) 2 X such that wJ
i (aJ) = f(aJ), and by the same lemma
we can make any action in Sj indifferent for player j = 2 J with-
out changing player i's payoff. For example, pick any w0 2 X,







 If aj(aj) = 0 for at least two players j, let w(a) 2 X be such that
wi(a) = vi. The existence of such w(a) follows from Lemma 4.4.
Then (a;vi) is enforced by w.
Only if part. Suppose that (a;vi) is enforced by continuation payoff
proles w(a) 2 X with wi(a) > vi.PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT 18
For any j 2 I+
i and any aj 2 Aj, it follows from player j's incentive con-
straints that we have
vj > (1 d)gj(aj;a j)+d å
a j2A j
a j(a j)wj(a):
Since j 2 I+
i , we can transform the above inequality to the following in-
equality about player i's payoffs:




thus we have vi > gi(aj;a j).
For any j 2 I 
i and any aj 2 Aj such that aj(aj) > 0, we have
vj = (1 d)gj(aj;a j)+d å
a j2A j
a j(a j)wj(a):
Since j 2 I 
i , we have




thus we have vi > gi(aj;a j). 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 4.11.




1 , then Qh = / 0 under any signal structure, and there is no
Ah-perfect public equilibrium for any d.
(2) If g11
1 < g22
1 , then for any signal structure p with perfect detectabil-
ity for the both players and any compact line segment in the rel-
ative interior of `, there exists e > 0 such that Qh is a nonempty
set containing the line segment under any signal structure  p such
that maxy;ajpy(a)   py(a)j < e; so there exists ¯ d < 1 such that v 2
E(Ah;d) for any d > ¯ d.
Proof. [Proof of Part 1] We use our algorithm under the restriction of Ah =
fa1;a2g to computethe set ofAh-perfect public equilibriumpayoff proles.
Let Q0 be the result of the rst step of the algorithm when continuation
payoffs are restricted to h. Since this is a one-dimensional problem, we
only need to consider two directions l1 = (b2; b1) and l2 = ( b2;b1).
Consider the linear programming problem for action prole a2 and direc-
tion l1. Let (v;w) be any collection of payoff proles satisfying constraintsPERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT 19
(a)-(d). For any y2Y, since v, w(y) are chosen from h and l1v> l1w(y),






2 )w2(y) > (1 d)g22
2 +dv2;
where a22
2 is player 2's action that maximizes g2(a2
1;a2). Therefore, v2 >
g22
2 , l1v 6 l1g22, and k0(a2;l1) 6 l1g22. Since k0(a1;l1) 6 l1g1, we
have
k0(l1) 6 max(l1g22;l1g1):
Similarly, we have k0(l2) 6 max(l2g11;l2g2). Therefore,
Q0 = H0(l1)\H0(l2)\h
 fv 2 h j min(g11
1 ;g2









1 , and g2
1 > g1





1). Therefore, `0 is the empty set or a singleton. Since neither a1
nor a2 is a static Nash equilibrium, we have Qh = / 0.
[Proof of Part 2] Similarly to Part 1, let Q0 be the result of the second
step of the algorithm when continuation payoffs are restricted to lie on h.
Let Y1, Y11, Y12, w1, and w12 be dened in Denition. We will show that
for any h with








action prole a1 and payoff vector v = g11 +(h; (b1=b2)h) can be en-
forced for the both players with continuation payoffs on the ray fv0 2 h j
v0















1) ( p1(a1)w1+  p12(a1)w12)
1   p11(a1)
:
Since w1, w12 > 0 and z ! h=(1 p11(a1)) > 0 as  p ! p, all w(y) satisfy
w1(y) > v1 when  p is close to p.PERFECT PUBLIC EQUILIBRIUM WHEN PLAYERS ARE PATIENT 20

























If player 1 deviates to a1 6= a1






which converges to (1 d)g11
1 +dv1 as  p!p. The limit is less than v1 since
h > 0. Therefore, this deviation is unprotable for player 1 when  p is close
to p.
If player 2 deviates to a2 6= a1















Since b1, b2 > 0, this deviation is unprotable for player 2 if v0
1 > v1 for  p






















1 +h) = v1:
Similarly, for any small h > 0, a2 and v = g22 (h; (b1=b2)h) can be
enforced with continuation payoffs on the ray fv0 2 h j v0
1 6 v1g when  p is
close to p. Therefore, for any compact line segment in the relative interior
of `, if  p is sufciently close to p, then Q0 includes the line segment, and
the algorithm stops with Qh = Q0. 
ECONOMICS DEPARTMENTS: HARVARD, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPO-
LIS AND HARVARD